Introduction
Much philosophical work on legal ethics defends a particular substantive theory. 1 These theories explain what the lawyer's professional responsibilities should be and why method also identifies a real-world dimension to otherwise theoretical debates about legal ethics. Every solution to the generative problem depends on verifiable assumptions and posits verifiable hypotheses. Thus, the generative method allows for testing claims about legal ethics that have, to date, largely been conjectured. This article has two main parts. Part I elaborates the generative method and describes what is a viable solution to the generative problem. Part II applies this method to three prominent theories of legal ethics. I conclude that none is based on a fully satisfactory solution to the generative problem. However, this finding should not be troubling. Rather, it invites a broader and more empirically informed conversation about legal ethics and professional roles.
I. The Generative method
Section (a) describes the generative problem and the form that solutions to it might take. Sections (b) and (c) show how solutions to the generative problem can be evaluated structurally and empirically.
a. Solutions to the Generative Problem: Mechanisms and Effects
In debates about legal ethics, the generative problem is the question of how the lawyer's role could generate reasons for action. A solution to the generative problem establishes that a specific set of features (F) of a role (R) give the agent who occupies the role (A) reason to act in a certain way (to do X or not to do X). Thus, solutions to the generative problem take the following form:
F of R generates reason for A [not] to do X.
Every solution to the generative problem has two important aspects. The first is its account of the role's generative mechanism, or the specific features in virtue of which a role generates reasons for the role-occupant. The concern here is whether F, rather than some other features of R, explain A's reasons.
The second aspect is a solution's account of the generative effect of a role. If occupying a role can make a difference to someone's reasons for action, how much difference can it make? Even if a role can generate some reasons for action, it is an open question whether the role generates reasons to act in any particular way. To verify a statement about the generative effect of a role, we need to establish a tight connection between R and A's having reason (not) to do X.
Let's consider these issues more thoroughly in the context of legal ethics. Do lawyers have compelling reasons to act in certain ways? If so, do their roles explain these reasons? 4 When you have a compelling reason to do X, your X-ing is justified. Your having reason to do X also affects how others may respond to your X-ing. When you do X for a good reason, it is inappropriate to criticize you in certain ways. 5 Further, your reasons affect the reasons of others. Where you have a good reason to do X, others might 4 In general, a reason is a consideration that bears on a question. See Pamela Hieronymi, 'The Wrong Kind of Reason ' (2005) 102 Journal of Philosophy, 437, 444 . To say that reasons are considerations is to deny that they are mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, or intentions), so much as 'the propositions, facts, states of affairs, events, or objects that might serve as the content of such mental states, that which beliefs or desires are about.' Ibid., at 438. Practical reasons are considerations that bear on the question of what to do, rather than theoretical reasons (which bear on the question of what to believe). Ibid, at 444. 'Normatively compelling' reasons are considerations that can fully justify and/or guide someone's action or belief, rather than those that merely explain or figure in the explanation of that action or belief. See Joseph Raz, 'Reasons: Explanatory and Normative' in Constantine Sandis (ed), New Essays on the Explanation of Action (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009 ). I use the terms 'reasons' and 'good reasons' both to mean normatively compelling (or conclusive) reasons for acting in a certain way. These kinds of reasons can figure thirdpersonally in justifying action, as well as first-personally in an agent's deliberation. My topic is how roles could generate such reasons. This topic differs from the issue of whether 'role morality' is transparent to 'ordinary morality,' as many legal ethicists put the question. For example, Arthur Applbaum concedes that roles can generate practical reasons, but focuses his attention on whether roles can generate moral reasons. Applbaum, Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and Professional Life (Princeton University Press, 2000) , 57. On the method proposed here, Applbaum's concession is precisely what is at issue.
have duties to refrain from interfering with (and perhaps to assist or accommodate) your doing X. 6 The generative problem arises, in part, out of these implications. Reasons are supposed to constrain your actions, to limit what you are justified in doing. 7 It would be strange if one could, by exercising her will, affect the reasons that she and others have.
Such an arrangement would invite Hume's charge of transubstantiation, wherein 'a certain form of words, along with a certain intention, changes entirely the nature of an external object, and even of a human creature.' 8
Explaining how the lawyer's role could generate reasons, then, requires specifying the generative mechanism. Similar issues arise in debates about promising.
How could your promise to do X make it the case that you have a reason to do X?
Philosophers propose a variety of mechanisms to explain how promises generate reasons.
Practice-based views argue that the source of a promise's normativity is the convention or practice of promising itself. 9 In making a promise, one implicates a broader social convention. This convention explains why the promisor has reason to keep her promise.
Practice views differ in their description of how the convention of promising endows individual promises with normative significance. 10 However, on all such views, promises 6 On the former, see R Jay Wallace, 'The Publicity of Reasons ' (2009) 23 Philosophical Perspectives, 471, . On the latter, see Seana Shiffrin, 'Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation' (2000) 29 Philosophy & Public Affairs, 205, Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1986) , 84 ('We cannot create reasons just by intending to do so and expressing that intention in action. Reasons precede the will.') 8 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (PH Niddich (ed), Clarendon Press 1978), 524.
9 Hanoch Sheinman, 'Introduction' in Hanoch Sheinman (ed), Promises and Agreements, (Oxford University Press, 2011), 3, 12 & 24. 10 John Rawls offered a two-tiered view about the normativity of promises: first, the practice of promising itself is just; second, the individual promisor who 'invokes the rule and accepts the benefits of' this practice has a duty based on the 'principle of fairness.' A Theory of Justice (Rev Sub Harvard University Press 1999), 304-5. Niko Kolodny and R Jay Wallace offer an alternative practice-based account: the reasons to keep one's promise include moral reasons not to undermine or exploit a valuable social practice (like that of promising). See 'Promises and Practices Revisited ' (2003) 31 Philosophy & Public Affairs, 119, 148-51. do not directly create reasons. Rather, the act of promising changes the reasons applicable to the promisor by invoking the convention of promising.
Others dispute that the normative significance of promising is necessarily conventional. One such non-conventionalist position is based on autonomy. In promising, the promisor voluntarily commits her will or invests her agency toward the object of the promise. 11 This commitment or investment generates a reason for the promisor to act in the way specified by the promise. Others have reason to hold the promisor to her promise as a way of respecting her agency.
Another position, defended by T.M. Scanlon, sees the 'value of assurance' as the source of the normativity of promises. 12 For Scanlon, the promisor's reason to keep her promise follows from a broader prohibition on disappointing the expectations of others that one has induced.
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David Owens advances still another position: promises have normative significance because they serve our 'authority interests.' 14 For Owens, a promise to do X is a grant of authority to another, a way of taking the decision about whether to do X out of the promisor's hands. By implication, breaking a promise is wrong because it is ultra vires. In failing to do X after she has promised to do X, the promisor acts on authority that she lacks.
This brief discussion suggests a parallel to legal ethics. In debates about promises, controversy over the generative mechanism asks how your promising to do X could give Brutal Cross-Examination: A lawyer is defending a rapist, who has informed the lawyer that he is guilty, but who insists on offering as defence the falsehood that the victim consented to have sex with him. The client is unrepentant and unshakeable-he has gotten away with the same defence in the past. To make it seem plausible that the victim consented and then turned around and charged rape, the lawyer would have to conduct cross-examination so that the witness "look[s] like a whore." This technique requires humiliating and browbeating the witness, knowing that if she blows up she will seem less sympathetic, while if she pulls inside herself emotionally she loses credibility as a victim.
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The goal of aggressive cross-examination is to secure the client's acquittal. The supposition is that humiliating the witness will undermine her credibility, thereby improving the client's chances of acquittal. May the lawyer aggressively cross-examine the witness?
As a general matter, this conduct seems impermissible. Aggressively interrogating the victim of a crime is a direct harm. It aims to humiliate the witness and might well compound the degradation of the underlying wrong. Harming someone without a good reason invites serious moral criticism. This conduct also raises the prospect of moral complicity. As Christopher Kutz has argued, your complicity in another's wrong can be based on your endorsing the wrong, even when you neither intend nor cause the wrong.
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Normally, acting on behalf of a rapist in these ways would be tantamount to endorsing the conduct, or at least failing to repudiate it to the extent morally required. Further, to provide post-crime aid is normally to be an accessory after the fact, which invites anadditional charge of moral complicity. 29 Finally, helping a rapist evade punishment seems sufficient to make one complicit in the rapist's future assaults. A structurally viable solution to the generative problem should, at a minimum, be congruent and robust.
Congruence: A solution to the generative problem is congruent when its account of the generative mechanism meshes with its account of the generative effect. For example, a maximalist position on the generative effect of the lawyer's role posits that lawyers could be permitted or required to act in otherwise impermissible ways. Everyone has compelling reasons not to act impermissibly. Doing so usually subjects one to powerful criticisms. Thus, the defender of the maximalist position must show that rolebased reasons can overrule or outweigh or defeat the ordinarily weighty reasons against such actions. This defence requires a powerful account of the generative mechanism. The graver the wrongs that a role could justify, the more powerful the account of the generative mechanism must be. A solution risks incongruence if its account of how roles generate reasons is not powerful enough to support its conclusions about the normative difference that roles can make.
The Brutal Cross-Examination case illustrates the importance of congruity.
Harming the rape victim and being complicit in a rape are serious wrongs. Arguing that aggressively cross-examining the rape witness is permitted or required requires offering a powerful account of the generative mechanism. This account must show that the lawyer's role implicates highly compelling interests. It must also show why these interests are served by aggressively cross-examining the witness, and (perhaps) that these interests would not be served by actions that did not involve degrading or humiliating the witness.
Because everyone has compelling reasons to avoid degrading and humiliating others, the account should also explain why these background reasons do not constrain the lawyer's behaviour in this case. If an account of the generative mechanism cannot meet these challenges, then it does not mesh well with the conclusion that the lawyer's role could justify aggressive cross-examination.
Congruence is a structural requirement. A solution is deficient if it needs, but cannot provide, an account of how the lawyer's role generates compelling reasons to act in ways that are otherwise impermissible. Because congruence is a structural requirement, an incongruous solution can be rejected as an account of how the lawyer's role generates reasons, regardless of the plausibility of its conclusions about legal ethics.
Robustness:
A solution to the generative problem is robust when its account of the generative mechanism and generative effect travel. Every solution picks out certain features of the lawyer's role that make a normative difference. We can assess a solution's robustness by asking whether other roles with the same features generate similar reasons and justifications for role-occupants. Robustness requires not only that the occupants of these analogous roles have similar reasons, but also that these role-based reasons are explained by the common features of the roles.
For example, suppose a theory of legal ethics concludes that the lawyer's role can require her to maintain client confidences, even where disclosure would otherwise be required. Suppose also that this conclusion is attributed to two specific factors: that the client is vulnerable and that allowing the lawyer to disclose confidences would inhibit whether the proposed solution is an adequate explanation of the lawyer's obligations. We might ask whether factors other than vulnerability and inhibition are needed to explain why the lawyer has reason not to disclose client confidences. Alternatively, the lack of robustness might lead us to question not the solution's logic, but the conclusion that it is taken to support. Perhaps the client's vulnerability and the potentially inhibiting effects of disclosure are insufficient to relieve role-occupants of their broader duties to help others.
Thus, when a solution to the generative problem is not robust, we can doubt that it offers a plausible account of the generative mechanism or the generative effect of the lawyer's role.
To say that solutions must be robust is not to say that the justifications for the lawyer's role must generalize within or across societies. Not every theory of legal ethics aspires to generality. Some assign normative importance to features that are unique to the lawyer's role. 32 The robustness requirement is not meant to rule out these solutions in advance. Rather, it prevents these solutions from avoiding generalization by fiat. If a solution posits that certain kinds of reasons are restricted to the legal domain, then it must explain and justify this domain restriction. Otherwise, it is structurally deficient.
c. Empirical Evaluations
The generative method also opens new avenues for empirical inquiry. This empirical inquiry is not a matter of testing the conclusions that a solution reaches. Second, we can assess the empirical adequacy solution's account of the generative mechanism. Recall that an account of the generative mechanism specifies the features of a role that make a normative difference. It contends that F, rather than some other features of R, explain why A has reason to do X. There is a necessary connection between mechanism and effect. When the features specified by the mechanism are present, a role should generate reason to do X. When they are absent, a role should not generate reason to do X. We can test such hypotheses using survey methods developed by psychologists and experimental philosophers. First, we should isolate features of the role that are hypothesized to be normatively significant. Then, we should identify realworld or experimental circumstances where these features are (or are not) present.
Finally, we should examine whether the predicted conclusions about the reasons of roleoccupants are borne out. If not, then we can question the descriptive accuracy of solution.
33 Thanks to William Simon for encouraging me to clarify this point.
A descriptively inaccurate solution might offer a valid account of how roles could generate reasons, but it does not explain how roles do generate reasons for us.
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Third, we can assess the empirical adequacy of accounts of the generative effect.
As noted above, maximalist positions predict that the lawyer's role can permit (or require) lawyers to act in ways that are otherwise forbidden. 
II. Evaluating Three Theories of Legal Ethics
In this Part, I apply the generative method to three prominent theories of legal ethics. For each theory, I first describe its main tenets and identify its implicit solution to the generative problem. arises. When transmission conditions are met, this broader institutional justification applies to specific institutional roles. In the case of the lawyers, the broader source of justification is the adversarial system, or perhaps the legal system itself. Where (and to the extent that) the legal system is justified, the lawyer's professional actions in accordance with the principles of partisanship and non-accountability are also justified.
The Hired Gun solution also offers a tracking hypothesis: the justification for the lawyer's role tracks the broader justification for the institution in which that role arises.
On this hypothesis, the more justified the institution, the greater the justification for the occupants of institutional roles to act in ways that depart from otherwise applicable requirements. 41 The less justified the institution, the less justification for role-occupants to perform professional actions that are otherwise impermissible. Good Lawyer, 1983, 25, 36 ('[N] one of the moral arguments for roles are stronger than the justifiable confidence in the overall justice and utility of the institutions within which the roles are established and in terms of which they are sought to be justified.').
42 Luban (n 1), at 58 (the 'weaker the justification of the institution, the weaker the force of [role-based] obligation in overriding other morally relevant factors').
43 Dare (n 1), at 44. The transmission mechanism has a distinguished philosophical pedigree. See John Rawls, 'Two Concepts of Rules ' (1955) 53 For Luban, the lawyer's role-obligations are largely justified by the adversarial legal system. Yet, in the civil context, the adversarial system is only pragmatically (rather than intrinsically) justified. Luban (n 1), at 62. Therefore, on Luban's argument, the justification for the legal system does not transmit to the roleactions of lawyers in the civil context. stringent interpretation of the transmission conditions, lawyers seem to lack many of the role-based reasons that Hired Gun views assign them.
Recognizing this, most advocates of the Hired Gun position argue for laxer transmission conditions. Tim Dare, for example, argues that successful transmission requires only that legal institutions institutions be morally good (whether they are intrinsically or comparatively justified is irrelevant); and that a role-obligation be part of a role as that role is presently constituted, rather than essential to the performance of the role.
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Determining the conditions under which institutional justifications transmit is crucial to the viability of the Hired Gun solution. If more stringent standards apply, then the lawyer's role will almost never generate reasons to act in otherwise impermissible ways (and the principles of partisanship and non-accountability look unsupported). The Hired Gun view only works if lax transmission standards apply. Yet no defender of the Hired Gun view has ever made a persuasive case for why lax transmission standards do or should apply. 56 Absent such an argument, the Hired Gun solution appears incongruent.
We can also question whether the transmission mechanism is capable of generating compelling reasons at all. This mechanism seems to leave out important elements of the justification of role-actions. The transmission mechanism is an example of justification by subsumption: the justification for role-actions is based on some more 55 Dare (n 1), at 45-6. Also, Dare would probably allow that institutional justifications transmit whenever an institution is justified at all, rather than (as Luban posits) only when the institution is intrinsically justified.
56 Dare in essence resolves this stringency issue by fiat, arguing that a strict interpretation of the transmission mechanism does not preserve an analytic distinction between 'role morality' and 'ordinary morality. ' Ibid, at the principles of partisanship and non-accountability do not acknowledge this sensitivity.
On Ordinary Morality views, the lack of sensitivity to the interests and rights of others, rather than the licensing of partiality itself, explains why the principles of partisanship and nonaccountability are defective.
On Ordinary Morality solutions to the generative problem, roles function by changing the generally applicable normative principles that apply to role-occupants. After
David Enoch, I call this a triggering mechanism: roles make a normative difference by activating existing reasons that their occupants have, rather than by creating new ones.
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To use Enoch's example, a pedestrian can, by placing his foot on the road, 'give a driver a reason to stop, but only because the driver had all along, and independently of the pedestrian's actions, the conditional reason-to-stop-should-a-pedestrian-start-crossing. By placing his foot on the road, the pedestrian thus triggers this pre-existing, conditional reason, thereby giving the driver a reason to stop.' 81 In other words, on the triggering mechanism, your role can change a reason that there is into a reason that you have. On the versions of the Ordinary Morality view considered here, brutal cross-examination could be licensed under some conditional moral principles. Does the lawyer's role trigger (or helps trigger) any such principles in these circumstances? Probably not. Brutal crossexamination violates dignity (contra Luban's criterion) and aims to bring about a substantively unjust result (contra Simon's criterion). Therefore, the lawyer's role does not generate a reason to brutally cross-examine the witness, although it might generate such a reason if, under the circumstances, brutal cross-examination would advance the fundamental interests (say, in dignity or autonomy or justice) that the lawyer's role is supposed to advance.
83 Applbaum (n 4), at 3.
Structural Evaluation: Ordinary Morality solutions are structurally unproblematic. For one thing, they do not raise any obvious problems of congruence.
Because these solutions take a moderate position on the generative effect of roles, their defenders need not argue that role-based reasons can defeat or override other compelling normative considerations. Rather, one need only show how roles can generate obligations for role-occupants to act in ways that are otherwise permissible. This effect is often taken for granted in debates about professional ethics, and can be explained in a number of ways (for example, on grounds of autonomy, fairness, authority, or the value of the practice of law). Because of this moderate position on the generative effect of roles, Ordinary Morality solutions explain role-based reasons well enough to avoid incongruity.
Nor do Ordinary Morality solutions face problems of robustness. The triggering mechanism is robust by definition, since it denies that roles uniquely generate reasons.
Indeed, the lawyer's responsibilities toward her client are a species of broader duties of beneficence and partiality.
Empirical Evaluation: It is perhaps unsurprising that Ordinary Morality solutions have few structural defects. The triggering mechanism is the simplest of any that we will examine. Also, the moderate position on the generative effect of roles requires less extensive defence than the maximalist position. The worry is that Ordinary Morality solutions buy this structural plausibility at the cost of descriptive inadequacy. In particular, Ordinary Morality solutions might undersell the normative difference that roles make. Thus, in testing Ordinary Morality solutions, we should carefully examine whether it leaves out important aspects of how roles generate reasons.
We can empirically evaluate Ordinary Morality solutions in at least three ways. Legitimate legal systems can authoritatively resolve these disagreements and coordinate collective action. However, to perform these functions, a legal system must grant substantive and procedural entitlements to all citizens. Thus, Wendel argues, the principles of partisanship and non-accountability are justified because they protect the entitlements of the lawyer's client, thus bolstering the legitimacy of the legal system.
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The lawyer's role generates reasons to act in specific ways that would otherwise be morally impermissible. These reasons are explained by need for legal authority and the lawyer's duty to respect law's accomplishment. Call this the authority mechanism. Discontinuity solution attributes a high generative effect to roles. To be congruent, the authority mechanism must be capable of generating compelling reasons. Yet it is doubtful that the authority mechanism can do this.
The difficulty here parallels one facing practice-based accounts of promising, described above. On the latter, the value of the practice of promising explains the normative significance of promises. When a promisor breaks her promise, she (inter alia)
wrongs her fellow participants in the practice of promising. To make or accept a promise is, by definition, to participate in this practice. However, valid promises typically have normative significance for people besides promisors and promisees. Unlike principals, these third parties are not necessarily participants in the practice of promising. Yet practice accounts cannot easily explain why promises have normative significance for these non-participating third parties.
The Discontinuity solution offers, in part, a practice-based account of the normativity of roles. 94 That the authoritative standards for a valuable practice permit or require role-occupants to do X explains why the role-occupant has reason to do X. Yet, to be compelling, such role-based reasons must be justifiable to everyone, not merely the role-occupants and their relatives. 95 The authority mechanism faces difficulties similar to those of practice-based accounts of promising. It must explain why the authoritative standards of a practice (in this case, those governing the practice of law) have normative significance for third parties who do not obviously participate in the practice. This hurdle is especially high where the standards of the practice impose significant costs on these third parties.
To illustrate this problem, consider the Brutal Cross-Examination case. Suppose that the relevant rules of professional conduct permit or require the lawyer's aggressive cross-examination. Aggressive cross-examination is not integral to legal legitimacy.
Many legitimate legal systems forbid these tactics. Nor is it integral to the role of lawyer.
Rather, these tactics are justified (if at all) because they are permitted or required by professional authorities. This authorization might well justify these tactics to the lawyer and client. Does it also provide sufficient justification to the witness? The advocate of the Discontinuity solution must offer some explanation why practice-based norms provide 94 In the terms discussed above, Wendel offers a combination of the authority and practice-based explanations for the normativity of the lawyer's role. 95 See Scanlon (n 12), at 162. See also GA Cohen's 'interpersonal test,' which defines an argument's political justification by whether it could 'serve as a justification of a mooted policy when uttered by any member of society to any other member. ' Rescuing Justice and Equality (Harvard University Press, 2008) , at 42.
justification to non-participants, or else provide some explanation of the justificatory force of role-based reasons that does not rely on the authority mechanism. If these gambits do not succeed, then the discontinuity solution is incongruent. The authority mechanism would not be able to provide the compelling reasons in favour of professional actions (as required to cohere with a maximalist position on the generative effect of roles) because it would not be able to provide a justification to everyone affected by these actions.
A second concern is whether the Discontinuity solution is robust. Consider how the authority mechanism works in the Brutal Cross-Examination case. Norms governing the professional conduct of lawyers render brutal cross-examination permissible as a way of vindicating the legitimate interests of one's client. The conduct allowed by these norms is morally unjustified, but not so unjust as to threaten the overall legitimacy of the legal system. Because professional norms generate reasons for acting in the way that they specify, the lawyer's reasons for acting as her role requires are a species of her reasons to maintain fidelity to law. Nor would such a pronouncement seem capable of generating exclusionary reasons for role-occupants. If the deliberative process described by the authority mechanism were accurate, then it's plausible that the physician would not even contemplate the morality of hastening the death of others in order to benefit her patient. Yet, as an intuitive matter, this pattern of deliberation seems morally deficient. Thus, the authority mechanism does not plausibly explain the physician's reasons in the transplant case, although it must do so in order to be viable on its own terms. Review, 1413 Review, , 1433 Review, -1435 mechanism is correct, then the content of professional norms should determine the reasons that role-occupants have. We would confirm this hypothesis if variations in the content of the applicable professional norms altered the classification of the role-actions.
The authority mechanism also predicts that this correlation is symmetrical. Controlling for other factors, professional norms prohibiting an action-type should strongly correlate with the judgment that the action-type is prohibited. Also, professional norms requiring the performance of an action-type should strongly correlate with the judgment that the action-type is required. We would disconfirm these hypotheses if lay classifications are not determined by the content of professional norms, or if this correlation is asymmetrical Perhaps no theory of legal ethics can fully explain and justify the professional actions of lawyers. This prospect should not invite despair. My own hunch is that the best approach to the generative problem involves some combination of the solutions considered above. On such a hybrid approach, different solutions explain different kinds of reasons that the lawyer's role generates. Hybrid accounts offer powerful explanations for other aspects of our normative world, such as how promises can generate reasons.
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A hybrid approach would also suggest that normative significance of roles is complex, as some philosophers have noted. 104 Thus, I suspect that many theories of legal ethics are right about something, even if none is right about everything.
Conclusion
Every theory of legal ethics rests on an implicit solution to the generative problem. For such a solution to be viable, it must offer a plausible account of the generative mechanism (or how the role generate reasons) and the generative effect (or the normative difference that the role can make) of the lawyer's role. These solutions can and should be empirically verified. None of the major theories of legal ethics is based on a fully satisfactory solution to the generative problem. Some of these solutions are structurally deficient. Future philosophical work in legal ethics should aim to address or resolve these structural issues, as well as to verify these empirical hypotheses and 
